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South Camden and Environmental Justice:
Substance, Procedure, and Politics
by Jeffrey M. Gaba
n two recent decisions styled South Camden Citizens inActi n v. New Jer ey Departmen  ofEnvironmental Pro-
tection,' Judge Stephen M. Orlofsky of the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey has seemingly put some
teeth in the environmental justice movement. The judge not
only found that private parties have a cause of action for vio-
lation of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) Title VI environmental justice regulations,2 but,
based on the failure of the New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (NJDEP) to properly consider envi-
ronmental justice issues, he vacated air quality permits is-
sued by the NJDEP and enjoined operation of a cement plant
in Camden, New Jersey.
3
Although the finding of a private cause of action is the
most striking aspect of the opinions, there are a number of
other fascinating implications of these decisions. First, in
applying Title VI civil rights legislation to environmental
permitting, the judge apparently applied a new, general en-
vironmental standard of "no significant adverse affect" for
permit decisions that disproportionately affect minority
communities. Thus, a new standard may have been added to
the roster of environmental standards and acronyms.
Second, the specific Title VI violation found by the
judge was the failure of the NJDEP to assess disparate en-
vironmental impacts of its permitting decision. The opin-
ion, however, nowhere discusses the substantive author-
ity that state permit writers have to either deny or condi-
tion environmental permits based on a finding of dispa-
rate adverse impact. Based on EPA's positions on its own
permit authority and EPA's Title VI guidance, it is quite
likely that states have minimal legal authority to take
such actions.
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1. No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472 (D.N.J. Apr. 19, 2001) (South Cam-
den I); No. 01-702,2001 WL 491965 (D.N.J. May 10, 2001) (South
Camden II).
2. 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2000).
3. On June 15, 2001, the Third Circuit lifted the district court's in-
junction that prohibited operation of the cement plan; the court in-
dicated doubt about the district court's decision that a private cause
of action existed under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act to assert a vio-
lation of Title VI regulations. See LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 20,
2001, at 3. Briefs have been filed and an expedited ruling on the
merits could be issued by late summer. See section entitled The
South Camden Decisions, infra, for a discussion of the district
court's holding.
Even if this is the case, however, the South Camden deci-
sions and EPA's Title VI regulations will still be important
tools in the environmental justice movement. At a mini-
mum, Title VI requirements will require states to use what-
ever authority they have to minimize environmental im-
pacts of permits creating disparate impacts. Perhaps more
significantly, a Title VI assessment, whether compelled by
private parties through a private cause of action orby EPA
through its Title VI authority, will be an important politi-
cal tool.
Environmental Justice and Title VI
One of the most interesting developments in environmental
law has been the growing appreciation of the distributional
justice concerns of environmental pollution. Fueled by a se-
ries of studies that suggest environmentally harmful activi-
ties, such as waste disposal sites or polluting industries, are
disproportionately located in minority communities,4 civil
rights and environmental justice advocates have increas-
ingly brought attention to the potential discriminatory appli-
cation of environmental laws. The major, although not ex-
clusive, focus of environmental justice concerns has in-
volved the permitting by state and federal officials of harm-
ful facilities in minority neighborhoods.5
Although the environmental justice movement has fo-
cused the attention of the environmental community on a
critical injustice, the movement has been limited by a lack of
legal tools to address the issue.6 Environmental justice
claims based on violation of the Equal Protection Clause
face the almost insurmountable burden of proving discrim-
inatory intent.7 Executive Order No. 12898, issued by
President William J. Clinton, requires federal agencies to
consider environmental justice issues, but the Executive
4. See generally Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Dis-
criminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation and Equal Compen-
sation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329 (1995); Vicki Been, What's Fairness
Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally
Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993).
5. Separate issues have been raised about discriminatory enforcement
of environmental laws. In 1992, the National Law Journal, for ex-
ample, published the result of its investigation of federal enforce-
ment of environmental law suggesting that the federal government is
less responsive to environmental needs in minority communities.
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 52.
6. See generally Karen Smith, How the Legal System Has Failed the
Environmental Justice Movement, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 325 (1996-1997).
7. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb





Order itself creates no private right of action and provides
no new authority for agencies to address environmental
justice concerns.
8
Perhaps the most promising tool for addressing environ-
mental justice concerns has been Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.9 Title VI generally prohibits discrimination by
parties receiving federal funds. Section 601 directly pro-
vides that no person shall "on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any activity" covered by Title VI.10
Section 602 authorizes federal agencies to effectuate the
provisions of section 601 "by issuing rules, regulations, or
order of general applicability."u Although the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held that a violation of the prohibition in
§601 requires proof of discriminatory intent, 2 the Court's
opinions have generally held that agencies are free to estab-
lish Title VI regulations that prohibit activities by recipients
of federal funds that have discriminatory effects.
13
EPA in 1984 issued its Title VI environmental justice rej-
ulations (EPA Title VI regulations) pursuant to §602.
These regulations, found at 40 C.F.R. Part 7, expressly pro-
vide that "[n]o person shall be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving EPA assistance on
the basis of race, color, national origin.... ."15 The regula-
tions implement this general prohibition through a test
based on discriminatory impacts. The regulations expressly
provide that a recipient of federal funds are prohibited from:
8. Exec. Order No. 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 59
Fed. Reg. 762 (Feb. 11, 1994), ADMIN. MAT. 45075. Section 1-1 of
the Executive Order states that agencies are to implement its policies
"to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law .... Section
6-608 states that the Executive Order is not intended to create any
private rights. See In re Chemical Waste Management of Ind., 6
E.A.D. 66, ADMIN. MAT. 40392 (EPA EAB June 29, 1995) (discuss-
ing the legal implications of Exec. Order No. 12898).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§2000d et seq.
10. Id. §2000d.
11. Id §2000d-1.
12. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001); Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13. See Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. at 1511; Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of New York City, 43 U.S. 582 (1983).
14. U.S. EPA, Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving Federal Assis-
tance From the Environmental Protection Agency, 49 Fed. Reg.
1656 (Jan. 12, 1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2000)). In 1998,
EPA issued "interim guidance" on application of these regulations.
U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TrrLE VI
PERMrrS (1998) (available from the ELR Document Service, ELR
Order No. AD-3660). See Maura Lynn Tierney, Environmental Jus-
tice and Title VI Challenges to Permit Decisions: The EPA s Interim
Guidance, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 1277 (1999). EPA recently issued
two "draft" guidance documents that further expand on implementa-
tion of the Title VI regulations. U.S. EPA, Draft Title VI Guidance
for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental Per-
mitting Programs (Draft Recipient Guidance) and Draft Revised
Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints
Challenging Permits (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance), 65
Fed. Reg. 39650 (June 27,2000) (available from the ELR Document
Service, ELR Order Nos. AD-4517 (Draft Recipient Guidance) and
AD-4516 (Draft Revised Investigation Guidance) [hereinafter Draft
Title VI Guidance]. One document provides guidance to recipients
of federal funds on compliance with their Title VI obligations. The
other provides guidance on EPA's investigation of environmental
justice complaints. See Bradford C. Mank, The Draft Title VlRecipi-
ent and Revised Investigation Guidances: Too Much Discretion for
EPA and a More Difficult Standard for Complainants?, 30 ELR
11144 (Dec. 2000).
15. 40 C.F.R. §7.30 (2000).
[U]sing criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color, national origin,
or sex, or have the effect of defeating or substantially im-
pairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program
with respect to individuals of a particular race, color, na-
tional origin, or sex.
16
Upon a finding of a violation of these regulations, EPA may
withdraw funding to the recipient.
17
One major focus of the environmental justice movement
has been implementation of these requirements by EPA.
EPA has faced a growing number of petitions by private par-
ties seeking to have EPA act against state environmental
agencies receiving EPA funding. These petitions are gen-
erally based on claims that the state agencies' activities, par-
ticularly permitting decisions, have discriminatory impact.
Additionally, in response to Executive Order No. 12898,
EPA has increasingly addressed, if not acted on, environ-
mental justice concerns in its own permit decisions.
t9
What has been lacking has been a cause of action by citi-
zens groups directly against the allegedly discriminating
state agency or the offending facility. The availability of
such a cause of action was the main focus of the South Cam-
den decisions.
The South Camden Decisions
The South Camden decisions involve a challenge to a deci-
sion by the NJDEP to issue air permits to a proposed cement
processing plant to be operated by St. Lawrence Cement Co.
(SLC) in the Waterfront South neighborhood of Camden.
Waterfront South is overwhelmingly a minority community.
Sixty-three percent of the residents are African American,
28% are Hispanic, and 9% are non-Hispanic whites.
Forty-one percent of the residents are children.20 Although
located in the "Garden State," it is fair to say that Waterfront
South is not a garden spot. It is, as described by the judge, "a
popular spot for locating industrial facilities.",2' The neigh-
borhood, prior to the proposed operation of the cement re-
finery, already contained a large number of waste disposal
and recycling facilities, a sewage treatment plant, a power
plant, and two Superfund sites.
2
The proposed cement facility would contribute to exist-
ing pollution in the neighborhood. The facility itself would
directly emit particulates, mercury, lead, manganese, nitro-
gen oxides, carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, and volatile or-
ganic compounds. It would also indirectly increase the pol-
lution burden in the area from trucks serving the facility. The
opinion states that, annually, there would be 35,000 inbound
16. Id. §7.35(b).
17. Id. §7.130.
18. One commentator has noted that as of 1999, EPA had received 67 ad-
ministrative complaints claiming disparate environmental impacts
under Title VI. David D. Duncan, Environmental Justice and Per-
mitting: Cases Applying EPA 's Guidance and Regulations, ENVrL.
REG. & PERMrrNG, Summer 1999, at 105, 108. As of June 1, 2001,
the website for EPA's Office of Environmental Justice lists far more
than that number. See U.S. EPA, Title VI Complaints, at
http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagel/t6complnt.htm (last visited June 1,
2001).
19. See Duncan, supra note 18.
20. South Camden I, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 10.




truck deliveries to the facility and 42,000 outbound truck de-
liveries from the facility.
23
Although health and environmentaljustice concerns were
raised during the permit process, the NJDEP's general posi-
tion was that its actions satisfied environmental justice obli-
gations because the permits would assure compliance with
EPA's health-based national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS). The NJDEP conducted no site-specific health
assessment on the impact of the proposed facility.24
In South Camden I, the judge held, based on prior Third
Circuit cases, that citizens had a direct cause of action under
§602 of Title VI to sue the state for violating EPA's Title VI
regulations. Applying a preliminary injunction standard, the
judge also held that the plaintiff had established a likelihood
of success on the merits. In reaching this conclusion, the
judge held that the plaintiffs had met heir burden of proving
that the proposed facility would have a disproportionate and
significant "adverse affect" on the community and that this
affect was "caused" by the criteria. Although SLC offered
economic justification for the impact, the court held that
there was insufficient evidence to rebut the existence of the
significant adverse impact.
Five days after the issuance of South Camden I, the
Court issued its opinion in Alexander v. Sandoval.2 5 On a
5-4 vote, the Court in Sandoval held that there was no pri-
vate cause of action under Title VI for violation of agency
regulations issued under §602. The Court assumed, but
did not address, the issue of whether agencies had the au-
thority under §602 to promulgate Title VI regulations that
prohibit conduct based on discriminatory "impact" as op-
posed to "intent."
Not to be outdone (or undone), Judge Orlofsky, in South
Camden II, quickly issued an elaborate and well-reasoned
opinion that held that the plaintiff could rely on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 as an independent cause of action to assert that New
Jersey's practices violated EPA Title VI regulations. Section
1983, among other things, prohibits states "under color of
law" from depriving citizens of rights secured by the "Con-
stitution or laws," and the court concluded that EPA's Title
VI regulations created "a federal right" that could be en-
forced through a § 1983 action. Allowing an amendment of
the original complaint to allow plaintiffs to plead § 1983, the
court reaffirmed the substantive holdings in South Camden I
regarding violation of the EPA regulations.
23. Id. at 3-5.
24. According to the opinion, the NJDEP considered:
[0] nly whether the facility's emissions would exceed techni-
cal emissions standards for specific pollutants, especially
dust. Indeed, much of what this case is about is what the
NJDEP failed to consider. It did not consider the level of
ozone generated by the truck traffic to and from the SLC fa-
cility, notwithstanding the fact that the Waterfront South
community is not currently in compliance with [NAAQS] es-
tablished by EPA for ozone levels, nor did it consider the
presence of many other pollutants in Waterfront South. It did
not consider the pre-existing poor health of the residents of
Waterfront South, nor did it consider the cumulative environ-
mental burden already borne by this impoverished commu-
nity. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the NJDEP
failed to consider the racial and ethnic composition and popu-
lation of Waterfront South.
Id. at 2.
25. 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001).
Some Environmental Implications of South Camden
and Title VI
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the South Camden de-
cisions is the finding of a direct private action against state
practices that violate EPA's Title VI regulations. Although
the direct Title VI cause of action was rejected in Sandoval,
there is considerable support for the district court's conclu-
sion that § 1983 provides an alternative ground for the pri-
vate cause of action.26 But even in the absence of a direct pri-
vate cause of action, EPA's Title VI regulations may con-
tinue to be significant since the Court has not disputed the
federal agencies' ability to enforce Title VI regulations
through appropriate mechanisms.27 Thus, EPA may con-
tinue to put pressure on states to comply with the regulations
through threats of funding withdrawal, and private parties
still have the ability to petition EPA to act against states that
are alleged to have violated the regulations.
The application of EPA's Title VI regulations in South
Camden has other perhaps more significant implications for
environmental law.
Does itle VI Create a New Broadly Applicable
Environmental Standard of "No Significant Adverse
Affects "?
Environmental awyers are familiar with the variety of envi-
ronmental standards contained in federal environmental
statutes. The NAAQS in the Clean Air Act (CAA) are set on
a standard of "requisite to protect the public health" with an
"adequate margin of safety."28 Water quality standards un-
der the Clean Water Act are established to achieve the
fishable/swimmable standard of § 101 (a)(3).29 The general
standard for establishing conditions for hazardous waste
disposal facilities is "necessary to protect public health and
the environment.,30 Some of these standards can form the
basis for direct permit conditions; others are used to estab-
lish standards that are then translated into permit restric-
tions; others are merely hortatory with limited or no legal
significance. One of the most striking aspects of the South
Camden opinions (at least to this environmental awyer) is
the court's use of Title VI to establish a new, generally ap-
plicable, environmental standard of "no significant ad-
verse affect."
In South Camden I, the court evaluated compliance with
EPA's Title VI regulations based on an assessment of
whether the permit would have a "disparate impact" on a
minority population. Based on case law interpreting "dispa-
rate impact" in other contexts, the court held that plaintiffs
must establish that a facially neutral practice "detrimentally
affects persons of a particular race to a greater extent than
other races."31 Applying this standard, the court in South
Camden held that plaintiffs could likely prevail on a claim
26. See id at 1527 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. It remains to be seen whether the Court will continue its current posi-
tion that federal agencies may adopt "disparate impact" regulations
under §602 to implement a "discriminatory intent" standard under
§601.
28. 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1), ELR STAT. CAA §109(b)(1).
29. See 40 C.F.R. §131.10 (2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. §6923(a), ELR STAT. RCRA §3003(a) (Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA)).
31. South Camden I, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 34.
9-2001 31 ELR 11075
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER
that the state had violated EPA's Title VI regulations based
on an unrebutted showing that plaintiffs would suffer dis-
proportionate significant "adverse affects" that were
"caused" by the NJDEP's permitting practices.
The court quite properly concluded that the mere assur-
ance that the source would not violate national health-based
air standards would not assure the absence of local adverse
health effects. Anyone familiar with the methodology and
scope of NAAQS knows that this is self-evident. Thus, the
court found that the NJDEP had erred by not conducting a
site-specific assessment of the extent to which the residents
of Waterfront South would be "adversely affected" by per-
mitting the proposed facility.
What is remarkable is the source and scope of this re-
quirement to assess localized adverse affects. The court did
not conclude that he CAA required a site-specific assess-
ment of air quality; nor did it conclude that the appropriate
standard for assessing localized air quality impacts was any
standard found in the CAA or other environmental statute.
Rather, the court held that New Jersey would likely be found
in violation of a Title VI regulatory standard of significant
"adverse affects." Thus, the Title VI "disparate impact"
analysis became the standard for assessing environmental
adequacy of the state's permitting actions.
Application of such a Title VI "no significant adverse af-
fect" standard could have broad applicability. Nothing in the
court's analysis nor in EPA's Title VI regulations, for exam-
ple, limit the application of the "no significant adverse af-
fect" standard to consideration of the types of affects regu-
lated by the funded agency.32 In South Camden I, the main
focus was the air quality impacts associated with the issu-
ance of air permits, but presumably all environmental im-
pacts could be considered whether or not related to the juris-
diction of the funded agency. Thus, if a state agency receiv-
ing EPA funding issues an air quality permit, the water
quality impacts of the proposed facility would now be sub-
ject to the Title VI standard. Once there is a federal funding
handle through EPA's grant program, any state permit will
presumably be potentially subject to the broad-ranging Ti-
tle VI standard.
Nor is it clear that the application of EPA's Title VI regu-
lations is limited to consideration of the types of environ-
mental impacts that are generally regulated by EPA. If aes-
thetic or recreational loss is viewed as a "significant adverse
affect," permits issued by state agencies receiving EPA
funds would presumably be subject to a Title VI review for
such impacts. Plaintiffs in South Camden, in fact, claimed
that the permitting of the proposed cement plant would ad-
versely affect their "quality of life." The court rejected
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on this claim,
not because such an affect would not be covered by EPA's
Title VI regulations, but because the claim was unsupported
by the record.33 Similar "quality of life" concerns also
formed the basis of a claimed violation of EPA's Title VI
regulations in New York City Environmental Justice Alli-
32. EPA's Title VI regulations prohibit fund recipients from engaging in
practices that subject "individuals to discrimination" or "have the ef-
fect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the
objectives of the program .... 40 C.F.R. §7.35(b). Thus, it appears
there could be a violation of EPA's Title VI regulations for discrimi-
natory impacts unrelated to the particular EPA funding program.
Once there is a federal funding handle through EPA's grant program,
any state permit will presumably be subject to this Title VI standard.
33. South Camden 1, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 36.
ance v. Giuliani.34 In Giuliani, plaintiffs argued that New
York City's proposed sale or destruction of city lots contain-
ing community gardens would violate EPA's Title VI regu-
lations. The opinion did not identify the nature of EPA's
funding that related to the city's sale of city property, but
EPA's regulations are open to the construction that regard-
less of the funding source the recipient may not engage in
practices having discriminatory affects unrelated to the
funding itself.
Finally, actions by states funded by any other federal
agency that has similar Title VI regulations would also now
be subject o a similar environmental review. The reason EPA's
regulations were at issue in South Camden was not because
there were environmental impacts but because the state pro-
gram was funded by EPA. Environmental impact consider-
ations may now be relevant in any state program receiving
funds from federal agencies with similar regulations.
Thus, under the court's analysis, EPA's Title VI regula-
tions (and potentially other federal regulations) allow the
court to undertake a wide-ranging inquiry into the environ-
mental impacts of a proposed facility untethered to any stat-
utory environmental standard.
Does Title VI Grant New Substantive Authority to Deny or
Condition Private Permits?
Although the South Camden opinions are surprisingly cir-
cumspect on this issue, it appears that the state's Title VI
failure was its decision not to undertake any additional as-
sessment after finding compliance with the federal
NAAQS. Thus, it was the "criteria or methods" that violated
the regulations. The court's remedy was to enjoin the pro-
posed facility from operating "until the NJDEP performs an
appropriate adverse disparate impact analysis in compli-
ance with Title VI." '35 The court said nothing about what is to
happen after the NJDEP performs such an analysis. As-
suming that a properly performed analysis identifies dispa-
rate impacts, the court failed to consider whether the state
could deny the permit or impose enforceable conditions be-
yond those authorized by existing environmental statutes.
This raises the question of whether Title VI itself provides
substantive legal authority to prevent those impacts. Al-
though never discussed by the court in South Camden, EPA
has taken the position that EPA itself has no authority to pre-
vent or mitigate environmental justice concerns other than
the authority found in its environmental statutes. In In re
Chemical Waste Management of Indiana, Inc. ,36 EPA's En-
vironmental Appeals Board (EAB) held, in the context of
the permitting of a hazardous waste facility under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), that the
Agency could incorporate environmental justice concerns
only within the limits of its statutory authority under
RCRA.37 The EAB, however, identified two areas under
34. 214 F.3d 65, 30 ELR 20703 (2d Cir. 2000).
35. South Camden I, No. 01-702, 2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 53.
36. 6 E.A.D. 66, ADMIN. MAT. 40392 (EPA EAB June 29, 1995).
37. The EAB stated that:
[1]f a permit applicant meets the requirements of RCRA and
its implementing regulations, the Agency must issue the per-
mit, regardless of the racial or socio-economic composition
of the surrounding community and regardless of the eco-
nomic effect of the facility on the surrounding community.
6 E.A.D. at 73, ADMIN. MAT. at 40394 (emphasis in original).
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RCRA in which EPA had significant discretion to address
environmental justice issues. These included expanded pub-
lic participation and the "omnibus" authority in §3005(c) of
RCRA that allows EPA to impose permit conditions "nec-
essary to protect human health and the environment." Be-
yond that, EPA had no authority under RCRA to deny or
condition permits because of discriminatory impacts.38 Sub-
sequent decisions of the EAB have affirmed this limitation
on EPA's authority substantively to address environmental
justice concerns.%
These EAB decisions do not involve a consideration of
EPA's authority under Title VI; §602 and EPA's implement-
ing regulations do not apply to EPA. Rather, the EAB opin-
ions have largely focused on an analysis of EPA's authority
substantively to address environmental justice concerns
under Executive Order No. 12898. But it is unlikely that
Title VI or EPA's Title VI regulations grant states greater
authority to address environmental justice concerns than
EPA has itself.
EPA's Draft Title VI Guidance largely ignores the issue
of authority substantively to address disparate impacts.40
The guidance encourages fund recipients to reduce or
eliminate disparate adverse impacts and suggests a vari-
ety of possible remedial actions. The guidance is silent,
however, on the source of such authority simply stating
that EPA "expects that remedial measures that reduce or
eliminate alleged disparate impacts will be an important
focus of the informal resolution process.",41 EPA's earlier
Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administra-
tive Complaints Challenging Permits (Interim Guid-
ance), issued in 1998, stated that the Interim Guidance
did not alter the substantive authority possessed by
42funded agencies.
In the absence of authority under Title VI, the extent of a
state agency's ability to either deny or condition a state-is-
sued permit based on environmental justice concerns is
likely to turn on the particular authority granted by other
38. In discussing the scope of authority provided by the "omnibus" au-
thority in RCRA, the EAB stated:
[Iln response to an environmental justice claim, the Region
would be limited to ensuring the protection of the health or
environment of the minority or low-income populations. The
Region would not have discretion to redress impacts that are
unrelated or only tenuously related to human health and the
environment, such as disproportionate impacts on the eco-
nomic well-being of a minority or low-income community.
6 E.A.D. at 75, ADMIN. MAT. at 40394 (internal footnote omitted).
39. See, e.g., In re Envotech, L.P., 6 E.A.D. 260, ADMIN. MAT. 40454
(EPA EAB Feb. 15, 1996); In re EcoEldctrica, L.P., 7 E.A.D. 56,
ADMIN. MAT. 40632 (EPA EAB Apr. 8, 1997).
40. See supra note 14.
41. Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 14, at 39662 (emphasis added).
42. EPA's Office of Civil Rights, however, apparently has taken the po-
sition that state permitting decisions that result in a "discriminatory
effect" violate EPA's Title VI regulations even if the permitting au-
thority does not have the substantive legal authority to deny or condi-
tion the permits based on the discriminatory impacts. See U.S. EPA
OCR Investigative Report for the Title VI Administrative Complaint
File No. 5R-98-R5 (Aug. 17, 1998) (the Select Steel report) (cited in
South Camden I, No. 01-702,2001 WL 392472, slip op. at 28 (D.N.J.
Apr. 19, 2001)). One article describes EPA's 1998 Interim Guidance
as stating that EPA's Office of Civil Rights "will consider discrimi-
natory impacts regardless of whether the permitting agencies are
themselves independently authorized to guard against such im-
pacts ... " Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environ-
mental Justice Into EPA Permitting Authority, 26 EcOLoGY L.Q.
617, 627 (1999).
federal or state laws.43 Even with omnibus authority to pro-
tect human health and the environment, it is not clear that
states could impose permit conditions (or deny a permit) be-
cause minorities were subjected to disproportionate levels
of pollution if the emission limits otherwise satisfied the en-
vironmental criteria.
The court's failure to consider the state's ability substan-
tively to address the environmental justice issues is perhaps
the most unsatisfying part of the South Camden decisions.
Certainly such an analysis seems relevant to the issue of
"causation"-are the state's permitting practices "causally"
linked to the disparate impact? It is certainly clear, as the
court noted, that the disparate impacts in the community
would not arise "but for" the NJDEP permit. It may also be
the case that facility-siting decisions are in fact discrimina-
tory. It is less clear that the NJDEP had the authority to pre-
vent those impacts by denying or conditioning the permit.
Is Title VI a Political Rather Than a Legal Tool for
Environmental Justice?
To the extent that it forces permitting authorities to assess
and document disparate adverse impacts, EPA's Title VI
regulations will likely have three significant effects. First, if
an assessment indicates disparate impacts, states may be in
violation if they have not taken all available means to mini-
mize this impact. This will, however, focus on the state's le-
gal authorities under other statutes.
Second, identification of potential environmental con-
cerns is likely to result in increased opportunities for public
participation in the permit process. Whatever limits there
are regarding the states' ability to impose substantive permit
limitations, there should be little issue that states can pro-
vide broader opportunities for public participation in appro-
priate cases. EPA's Draft Recipient Guidance ncourages
"meaningful public participation and outreach.""
Third, and perhaps more importantly, Title VI may force
the public airing and recognition of disparate impacts and
environmental injustice. The remedy following such a
showing is likely to be more political than legal.45 Informa-
tion has its own power, and political pressure will almost
certainly follow from state documentation of impacts. Vol-
untary acceptance by the permittee of restrictions to mini-
mize impacts is likely.4 Additionally, "voluntary" aban-
donment of proposed facilities by the applicant in the face of
local opposition is also possible.47 Information produced by
Title VI analysis may also form the impetus for subsequent
changes to law to allow greater restrictions on facilities pro-
ducing disparate impact. All in the environmental commu-
43. See Lazarus & Tai, supra note 42 (interesting evaluation of sources
of authority in federal environmental laws to address environmental
justice concerns).
44. See Draft Title VI Guidance, supra note 14, at 39658.
45. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Be-
tween Environmental Laws and "Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REv. 221
(1997) (discussing the role of environmental justice claims in
achieving "political justice").
46. In South Camden 1, the court mentions that he owners of the pro-
posed cement facility had agreed to alter truck routes to minimize the
impacts on the community.
47. One of the most public battles over environmental justice involved
the siting of the proposed Shintech plastics facility in a predomi-
nately minority community in Louisiana. The company ultimately
abandoned their attempts to have the facility permitted in that area.
See Mank, supra note 14, at 11150.
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nity are aware of the power of public information.48 Thus,
the ultimate effect of the application of EPA's Title VI regu-
lations (either through a private cause of action or through
EPA decisions) may be more political than legal.
Conclusion
The South Camden opinions raise important civil rights is-
sues regarding the availability of a private cause of action
48. The public disclosure of toxic release information under the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§11023, ELR STAT. EPCRA §313, has produced powerful political
pressures to reduce emissions. The environmental impact statement
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§4332, ELR STAT. NEPA § 102, although construed by the Court as
essentially a procedural statute requiring documentation and disclo-
sure of significant adverse environmental impacts, is still a powerful
environmental tool.
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for violation of Title VI regulations. For the environmental
community, the opinions also have interesting implications
for the environmental standards to be used in judging a Title
VI "disparate impact" claim. The opinions are far less satis-
factory in assessing the substantive effects of EPA's Title VI
regulations on state permit decisions. Indeed, the opinions
deal more with assessing rather than addressing environ-
mental justice concerns.
It would, however, be a mistake to underestimate the
potential impact of a broad Title VI requirement o assess
the site-specific environmental impacts of proposed fa-
cilities on minority communities. Not only will such an
assessment form the basis for an expansive use of exist-
ing environmental authority, but it will also provide the
political power of voice and visibility to environmental
justice issues.
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